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A FAILED ATTEMPT TO TAKE BACK OUR
STREETS-A CONSTITUTIONAL TRIUMPH FOR
GANGS: CITY OF CHICAGO V. MORALES
I. INTRODUCrION
Nationwide, cities are trying to integrate proactive approaches into
their crime fighting initiatives. One such method has been by passing
anti-loitering statutes; these statutes are designed to be a practical
means for the police to put a halt to crime before it arises. However,
these statutes have been the polestar of constant scrutiny,1 and are con-
tinually undergoing constitutional attacks. Courts have repeatedly
struck down anti-loitering statutes for being unconstitutional. Three
challenges consistently arise: (1) the void for vagueness doctrine,2 (2)
the overbreadth doctrine,3 and (3) the attempt to criminalize an individ-
1. The level of scrutiny depends on the type of statute under fire. "Civil statutes and
economic regulations are examined with a lesser standard of specificity than are criminal stat-
utes." Joel D. Berg, Note, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang Loitering Laws, 69
CHi.-KENT L. REv. 461,470 (1993).
2. The Due Process Clause ensures that people are given fair notice and that laws are
not arbitrarily enforced. The vagueness doctrine is used to strike down statutes that do not
satisfy these requirements. See Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal
Statutes, 5 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 1, 4 (1997).
"[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause" not only "if it is
so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it pro-
hibits," but also if it "leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally
fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case."
Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (quoting Giaccio v. Penn-
sylvania, 382 U.S. 399,402-03 (1966)).
3. An overbreadth challenge arises under the First Amendment and is basically an asser-
tion that the law prohibits acts protected by the Constitution. See Richard H. Fallon Jr.,
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE LJ. 853, 858 (1991); see also City of Chicago v.
Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 37 (lI. App. Ct. 1995), affd sub nom. City of Chicago v. Morales,
687 N.E.2d 53 (fl. 1997), cert granted, 118 S. Ct. 1510 (Apr. 20,1998) ("The overbreadth doc-
trine 'allows a defendant to challenge the validity of a statute on its face when the mere exis-
tence of the statute may inhibit the exercise of expressive or associational rights protected by
the first amendment, even though those rights do not protect the rights of the defendant."')
(citation omitted).
Overbreadth is a label attached to two distinct concepts. First, the doctrine has a
substantive dimension that prohibits public officials from enforcing laws that in-
fringe on constitutionally protected freedoms. Second, the overbreadth doctrine has
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ual because of a "status., 4
In May 1992, the Chicago City Council met to discuss the unrelent-
ing problems that street gangs5 cause.' As a result, the city council en-
a procedural dimension characterized by a special standing rule that allows litigants
to raise the rights of third parties to challenge a statute's substantive infirmities.
Berg, supra note 1, at 472-73.
4. See Berg, supra note 1, at 478-83. An arrest cannot be based on mere suspicion or
simply criminalize a person because of who they are. See id. at 480; see also Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1961) (holding that punishing a person because of a status is similar to
cruel and unusual punishment).
Punishment for a status is particularly obnoxious, and in many instances can rea-
sonably be called cruel and unusual, because it involves punishment for a mere pro-
pensity, a desire to commit an offense; the mental element is not simply one part of
the crime but may constitute all of it. This is a situation universally sought to be
avoided in our criminal law; the fundamental requirement that some action be
proved is solidly established even for offenses most heavily based on propensity,
such as attempt, conspiracy, and recidivist crimes.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,543 (1967) (Black, J., concurring).
5. The phrase "gang" has numerous different meanings. "On the one hand there is the
romanticized 'West Side Story' adolescent band whose members are aggressive and rebel-
lious-but appealing. At the other extreme there is the 'gang' of organized crime-the Ca-
pone gang, or the Mafia families." JOHN HAGEEDORN & PERRY MACON, PEOPLE AND
FOLKS: GANGS, CRIME AND THE UNDERCLASS IN A RUSTBELT CITY 4-5 (1988). The
"gangs" targeted by the ordinance in Chicago are groups of individuals who partake in crimi-
nal conduct and engage in anti-social behavior, usually a group of individuals with a common
name and common identifying sign or symbol. See generally RANDALL G. SHELDON, ET AL.,
YOUTH GANGS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 14 (Sabra Home ed., Wadsworth Publishing Co.
1997).
6. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 57-58 (Ill. 1997), cert granted, 118 S.
Ct. 1510 (1998). The city council listened to residents discuss the problems that were caused
as a result of gang members loitering in the public. The council learned that gang members
loiter in an effort to "claim territory, recruit new members, and intimidate rival gangs and
ordinary community residents." Id Moreover, the council concluded that loitering often
leads to participation in illegal activities. See iL at 58. The City Council included its findings
into the preamble of the ordinance. The preamble reads:
WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other cities across the nation, has been expe-
riencing an increasing murder rate as well as an increase in violent drug related
crimes; and
WHEREAS, The City of Chicago has determined that the continuing increase in
criminal street gang activity in the City is largely responsible for this unacceptable
situation; and
WHEREAS, In many neighborhoods throughout the City, the burgeoning presence
of street gangs members in public places has intimidated many law abiding citizens;
and
WHEREAS, One of the methods by which criminal street gangs establish control
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acted the Gang Congregation Ordinance, giving police officers an al-
most blanket-like-power to make arrests.7 Known as the "gang loitering
ordinance," Chicago police officers who reasonably believed they saw a
gang member loitering," with another person or persons, were permitted
to order the people to disperse. Failure to comply with an officer's or-
der led to an arrest. Several people were charged with violating this or-
dinance, but the charges were consistently dismissed.9
In City of Chicago v. Morales,'0 the Supreme Court of Illinois struck
down Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance as unconstitutional.
The Morales decision illustrates the difficulty in drafting a loitering stat-
ute that is an effective tool in crime prevention but does not impinge
upon personal liberties and violate substantive due process. Further, the
decision sets forth guidelines for future legislators to rely on when un-
dertaking the task of drafting anti-loitering statutes. Conforming to
these guidelines will assure that a law provides fair notice and is not sus-
over identifiable areas is by loitering in those areas and intimidating others from en-
tering those areas; and
WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs avoid arrest by committing no of-
fense punishable under existing laws when they know the police are present, while
maintaining control over identifiable areas by continued loitering; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that loitering in public places by
criminal street gangs members creates a justifiable fear for the safety of persons and
property in the area because of the violence, drug-dealing and vandalism often asso-
ciated with such activity; and
WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in discouraging all persons from loitering
in public places with criminal gang members; and
WHEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to preserve the city's streets and other
public places so that the public may use such places without fear.
IcL at 58 (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015) (1992).
7. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992) reads:
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be
a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other
persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the
area. Any person who does not promptly obey such an order is in violation of this
section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no
person who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street gang.
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines "loitering" as: "To be dilatory; to be slow in
movement; to stand around; ... to lag behind; to linger or spend time idly." BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY 942 (6th ed. 1990).
9. See Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 57.
10. 687 N.E.2d 53.
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ceptible to being arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced.
This Note begins with the facts of Morales and the reasons for the
court's holding. Next, other relevant cases are discussed and each con-
stitutional challenge is examined; precedent highlights what a loitering
statute must contain to pass constitutional muster. An evaluation of the
case follows, and the holding of the court is compared with holdings in
similar cases. Finally, an analysis of the impact of the case is presented,
focusing on what legislators need to consider when attempting to draft
an acceptable anti-loitering statute, if indeed such a statute is conceiv-
able.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 15, 1993, defendants Youkhana and thirteen others were
charged with violating Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance." The
Cook County Circuit Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
the charges for being unconstitutionally vague. 2 The city appealed and
the appellate court affirmed the decision. Defendants in another case
were charged with violating the same ordinance; the circuit court dis-
missed the charges and the appellate court affirmed.' Similar charges
were again dismissed in circuit court when defendant Ramsey and forty-
nine other defendants were charged with violating the same ordinance.'"
Subsequently, the Cook County Circuit Court found defendant Morales
and five other defendants guilty of violating the ordinance and sen-
tenced them to jail.'6 The appellate court reversed the decision based on
its earlier holding." In Morales in October of 1997, the Supreme Court
of Illinois put an end to further inconsistent rulings and affirmed the de-
cision of the appellate court. In April of 1998 the Supreme Court of
11. Seeid at 57.
12. See id The appellate court found the law to be overly broad, violating First
Amendment rights (association, assembly and expression), too vague, violating the Fifth
Amendment, and designed to criminalize a person because of status, thereby violating the
Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the court held that the ordinance allowed arrests to be made
without probable cause. See id at 59.
13. See idt at 57.
14. See id
15. See id
16. See id The arresting officer's only basis for arresting Morales was that he was
wearing black and blue clothing--the colors of a particular street gang in Chicago. See id at
64 n.1.
17. See id at 57.
18. See id at 65. The trial courts in Cook County were not in agreement as to the consti-
tutionality of the ordinance. This appeal involved 70 different defendants who were charged
[Vol. 82:447
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the United States granted certiorari and the case is presently waiting to
be decided. 9
III. PRECEDENT
Loitering laws aimed at ending a distinct type of conduct or pre-
venting certain people from behaving a particular way have repeatedly
been struck down for several reasons.? Courts deem laws overly vague
in violation of the Fifth Amendment when a law fails to give notice of
the type of conduct that it prohibits, when it can be arbitrarily enforced
by law enforcement and when it criminalizes innocent behavior.2 ' When
a law is enacted that intrudes upon constitutionally protected freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment,2 it will most likely be found overly
broad.' When a law undertakes to punish a person for doing nothing,
with violating the Gang Congregation Ordinance. See id. at 57. The court held: (1) the terms
of the ordinance were not sufficiently clear so that ordinary persons could comprehend what
is prohibited conduct; (2) the ordinance did not adequately define offenses, and therefore it
encouraged arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; (3) the city police department's gen-
eral order providing guidelines for enforcement of the ordinance was not sufficient and (4)
the ordinance was an arbitrary restriction on personal liberty in violation of substantive due
process. See id. at 54. The court therefore did not determine whether the Gang Loitering
Ordinance "impermissibly infringes on either the first amendment right of expressive associa-
tion or the fundamental right of intimate association." Id. at 65.
19. See 118 S. Ct. 1510 (Apr. 20,1998).
20. There have been numerous decisions, from U.S. Supreme Court opinions to state
court decisions, that rule on the constitutionality of loitering ordinances aimed at curbing par-
ticular types of behavior. See infra, Part III.
21. Laws must be designed so that ordinary individuals are able to understand what type
of behavior is unlawful. See Peter W. Poulos, Chicago's Ban on Gang Loitering: Making
Sense of Vagueness and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 379, 389-91 (1995).
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has determined that a statute is too vague when it is "so
obscure that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning...." State v.
Zwicker, 164 N.W.2d 512,517 (Wis. 1969).
22. Both vagueness and overbreadth are constitutional challenges. Vagueness is a due
process issue and an overbreadth challenge stems from the First Amendment. See generally
Poulos, supra note 21.
23. A law will be found overly broad when it proscribes activity that is both constitu-
tionally protected as well as activity that may not be constitutionally protected, particularly
activities protected by the First Amendment. The overbreadth doctrine allows for an indi-
vidual to challenge the law on behalf of others; even if a person is in violation of a particular
law he or she may challenge the law if others may be found in violation for exercising a con-
stitutionally protected freedom. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
trine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 845-65 (1970); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Making Sense of Over-
breadth, 100 YALE LJ., 853, 855 (1991) ("First Amendment overbreadth is largely a
prophylactic doctrine, aimed at preventing a 'chilling effect."'); Lisa A. Kainec, Comment,
Curbing Gang Violence in America Do Gang Members Have a Constitutional Right to Loiter
on Our Streets?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 651, 654 (1993); see, e.g., Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S.
451 (1987); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611
1999]
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penalizing a person simply because of a status, it will most likely be
found to be an infraction of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.2
A. The Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,5 the Supreme Court struck
down a Florida vagrancy ordinance as unconstitutionally vague in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.' The ordinance made
common activities criminal.' In striking down the ordinance, the Court
held that these types of everyday activities are fundamental in today's
society.'
(1971); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
24. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that an individual cannot be
found in violation of an ordinance making narcotic addiction a crime). The Eighth Amend-
ment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
25. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
26. See id. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., OR. CODE § 26-57 (1965) read as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gam-
blers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards,
common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property,
lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers
and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose of object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all
lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame,
gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able
to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall
be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished
as provided for Class D offenses.
Id. at 156-57 n.1 (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., OR. CODE § 26-57 (1965)).
27. See id. at 163 ("The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which by mod-
ern standards are normally innocent.").
28. The Court stated:
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by Walt
Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The qualification "without any lawful purpose or
object" may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons "neglecting all lawful business and
habitually spending their time by frequenting ... places where alcoholic beverages
are sold or served" would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city
clubs.
Id- at 164 (citation omitted).
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[T]hese activities are historically part of the amenities of life as
we have know them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution
or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in
part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independ-
ence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity.
The court emphasized that an ordinance such as the Jacksonville
loitering prohibition is too vague because "it furnishes a tool for 'harsh
and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure."'3 Moreover, the
Court held that the ordinance did not give people adequate notice of
what particular type of conduct was proscribed.31 "This ordinance is
void for vagueness... in the sense that it 'fails to give a person of ordi-
nary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden
by the statute."'32 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that loitering,
alone, is not illegal and that a statute of this type is "too precarious" of a
law.33
In reaching its decision, the Court did not say that every type of loi-
tering law would be found unconstitutionally vague.' In dicta, the Pa-
pachristou court suggested what needs to be included in an anti-loitering
statute for it to withstand a constitutional challenge.35 Nevertheless, it is
29. Id. at 164.
30. Id at 170 (citation omitted).
31. See id. at 162.
32. Id. at 162 (quoting United States v. Hariss, 347 U.S. 612,617 (1954)).
33. Id. at 171; see, e.g., Wyche v. State of Florida, 619 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 1993)
("Hailing a cab or a friend, chatting on a public street, and simply strolling aimlessly are time-
honored pastimes in our society. ").
34. Vague statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
See generally Louisiana v. Muschkat, 706 So. 2d 429, 436 (La. 1998) (holding that a drug-
traffic loitering statute was unconstitutionally vague and criminalized constitutionally pro-
tected activities).
35. The Court said that laws should let people know what the State "commands or for-
bids." Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162. Further, the Court commented that a specific intent re-
quirement may have been helpful in saving the law from being found unconstitutional. See id.
at 162-63. Specific intent is defined as follows:
[A] 'specific intent' offense is one in which the definition of the crime: (1) includes
an intent to do some future act, or achieve some further consequence (i.e., a special
motive for the conduct), beyond the conduct or result that constitutes the actus reus of
the offense; or (2) provides that the actor must be aware of a statutory attendant cir-
cumstance. An offense that does not contain either of these features is termed 'gen-
eral intent.'
For example, consider common law burglary, defined as 'breaking and entering of
1999]
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obvious that the Court will not uphold any law that is deliberately
drafted in such an imprecise fashion that allows police officers an un-
bounded ability to make arrests. The Court concluded that the Jack-
sonville ordinance permitted individuals "undesirable in the eyes of the
police and prosecu[tors] [to be convicted] although they are not charge-
able with any other particular offense."36 In sum, the Court acknowl-
edged that although the ordinance may be an advantageous tool for
crime prevention, it cannot be upheld because of its inability to be en-
forced impartially. The specifications set forth by the Papachristou
Court will insure that future legislators who propose loitering ordi-
nances will not be enacting legislation that is unconstitutionally vague.-'
More recently, in Kolender v. Lawson," the United States Supreme
Court struck down a California loitering ordinance. The ordinance re-
quired people who were discovered loitering on the streets to identify
themselves and account for what they were doing.39 The ordinance re-
quired citizens to provide "credible and reliable identification and to ac-
count for their presence when requested by a police officer."' ' Of par-
ticular significance to the Court was the fact that the police had complete
discretion to decide if a suspect had furnished adequate identification
and acceptably explained his purpose for being about.41 Consequently,
the Court concluded that the ability to enforce the ordinance arbitrarily
existed.
The Kolender Court specifically pointed out that this type of vague
statute gives police officers too much discretionary power." In sum, the
the dwelling of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony.' The ac-
tus reus of this offense is complete when the offender breaks and enters another
person's dwelling at night; he need not commit a felony inside to be convicted of a
burglary. The requisite mens rea, therefore, pertains to a planned future act (com-
mission of a felony) that is not part of the actus reus. Consequently, a common law
burglary is a specific-intent offense.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.06, at 119 (2d ed. 1995) (foot-
notes omitted).
36. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 166.
37. See Berg, supra note 1, at 464-65.
38. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
39. See id at 353.
40. Id.
41. See id- at 361. The Court held that an initial detention by a police officer may be jus-
tified, but because there is no clear standard as to what satisfies the identification require-
ment, it fails to meet "constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity." laM
42. See id. at 358. ("The statute placed complete discretion in the hands of the police
and created the 'potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties."').
[Vol. 82:447
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Court addressed the vagueness issue, and held that the statute was:
"vague on its face because it encourage[d] arbitrary enforcement by
failing to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in
order to satisfy the statute."43 Without any sort of guidelines, the ordi-
nance is subject to abuse. Furthermore, because there was no notice re-
quirement, people did not have forewarning of what specific behavior
was proscribed." Due process requires that people be given reasonable
notice of what type of conduct is unlawful. 5 The undoing of the statute
occurred because failing to answer a police officer's question satisfacto-
rily would trigger an arrest, rather than an arrest resulting from some
sort of illegal conduct or behavior.
In Justice White's dissenting opinion, he rejected the majority's
finding that the statute was susceptible to a facial review46 because it was
claimed to be vague. 7 Justice White brought attention to the majority's
finding that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face. He sug-
gested that the requirement to furnish identification when requested by
a police officer is not necessarily nebulous in all of its applications." Jus-
tice White further emphasized the difference between challenging a
statute for being vague and for being overly broad 9  Justice White
pointed out that if a person knows that his conduct is criminal, he
couldn't successfully challenge the law because others may not be mind-
43. Id. at 361.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 357; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 503 (1982) (holding that the language in the ordinance is "sufficiently clear that
the speculative danger of arbitrary enforcement does not render the ordinance void for
vagueness").
46. A facial challenge to a law is an assertion that no "set of circumstances exists under
which the.., challenged law would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987) (holding that legitimate and compelling regulatory purposes of an act prevent it from
being facially invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
47. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 370-71 (White, J., dissenting). The court held that "none
of our cases 'suggests that one who has received fair warning of the criminality of his own
conduct from the statute in question is nonetheless entitled to attack it because the language
would not give similar warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its broad
and literal ambit."' Id. at 370 (citation omitted).
48. See id. at 371-72 (White, J., dissenting). White points out that a police officer may
make a perfectly appropriate stop and therefore be permitted to order a suspect to provide
identification. See id. at 371; accord Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 500.
49. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 371 ("But to imply as the majority does ... that the over-
breadth doctrine requires facial invalidation of a statute which is not vague as applies to a de-
fendant's conduct but which i§ vague as applied to other acts is to confound vagueness and
overbreadth .... .") (citations omitted).
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ful that their behavior is unlawful.' In conclusion, Justice White reiter-
ated that although the overbreadth doctrine allows a facial challenge
when a law intrudes upon rights protected by the First Amendment, he
believed that the majority was mistaken in using the overbreadth doc-
trine to permit a facial invalidation of a law that was not vague when
applied to the defendant, but may be vague when applied to others. 1
In 1989, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a similar statute52 in
City of Milwaukee v. Nelson.53 The statute was challenged as being both
too vague and overly broad. The court first considered the vagueness
challenge. The enacted statute prohibited loitering "in a place, at a time
or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances
50. See id. at 370. ("[I]t would be unavailing for him to claim that although he knew his
own conduct was unprotected and was plainly enough forbidden by the statute, others may be
in doubt as to whether their acts are banned by the law.").
51. See id. at 371. The dissent argued:
If the officer arrests for an act that both he and the lawbreaker know is clearly
barred by the statute, it seems to me an untenable exercise of judicial review to in-
validate a state conviction because in some other circumstances the officer may arbi-
trarily misapply the statute. That the law might not give sufficient guidance to ar-
resting officers with respect to other conduct should be dealt with in those situations.
Id
52. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld Milwaukee City Ordinance 106-31(1)(a).
The ordinance reads:
Loitering or Prowling. Whoever does any of the following within the limits of the
city of Milwaukee may be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or upon
default of payment thereof, shall be imprisoned in the house of correction of Mil-
waukee county for not more than 90 days.
LOITERING. Loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for
law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for safety of persons
or property in the vicinity. Among the circumstances which may be considered in
determining whether such alarm is warranted is the fact that the actor takes flight
upon appearance of a peace officer, refuses to identify himself, or manifestly en-
deavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless flight by the actor or other circum-
stances makes it impracticable, a peace officer shall prior to any arrest for an offense
under this section, afford the actor an opportunity to dispel any alarm which would
otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to identify himself and explain his pres-
ence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this section if
the peace officer did not comply with the preceding sentence, or if it appears at trial
that the explanation given by the actor was true and, if believed by the peace officer
at the time, would have dispelled the alarm.
439 N.W.2d 562,563 n.1 (Wis..1989) (quoting MIL., WIS., CITY ORD. 106-31(1)(a)).
53. 439 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. 1989).
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that warrant alarm for the safety or property in the vicinity." 4 The Nel-
son court drew attention to the fact that there was additional language
only limiting loitering in addition to some other sort of behavior. The
Nelson court upheld the ordinance because it met the criteria set forth
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court nine years earlier in Wisconsin v.
Starks.55 In 1971, the Starks court had held that a loitering ordinance
would be found constitutional if it met "specificity requirements as to
scope, place or purpose."56 In sum, the Nelson court was satisfied that
an arrest would not occur solely for loitering because the term loiter was
given a limited meaning.' The court concluded "that the ordinance here
is constitutional in that it provides sufficient notice and guidelines to law
enforcement officials, judges, and ordinary citizens by limiting the term
'loiter' in scope, place or purpose."
58
The court next examined the ordinance to determine if it was overly
broad. The defendant claimed that an individual could be at fault for
simply taking advantage of constitutionally protected freedoms.59 The
defendant argued that "a person could be subject to a loitering offense
while taking a stroll, sitting on a park bench, seeking shelter from the
elements in a doorway, or as a candidate shaking hands while cam-
paigning. ' The court was quick to point out, however, that it was
"highly unlikely" that a person would be doing any of the activities sug-
gested by the defendant in a "manner not usual for law-abiding indi-
viduals under circumstances that warrant alarm to police officers for the
safety of persons or property within the vicinity."61 In conclusion, the
court found that the ordinance was not overly broad because of the ad-
ditional requirement and the ability of a police officer to recognize eas-
ily what behavior is constitutionally protected and what is not. 2
54. Id at 563 n.1 (emphasis added).
55. See iU at 575; State v. Starks, 186 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Wis. 1971) (finding a vagrancy
statute unconstitutional because it did not name with "specificity and particularity the loca-
tions where loitering may not occur").
56. Starks, 186 N.W.2d at 248-49. The Starks court held that because the specificity re-
quirements were not met, the term loiter "renders the statute vague as it fails to provide fair
notice of the proscribed conduct, it classifies innocent conduct as criminal, and it is suscepti-
ble to arbitrary law enforcement." Id at 248.
57. See 439 N.W.2d at 567.
58. Id. (emphasis added); see also City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 291 N.W.2d 452, 456-57
(Wis. 1980).
59. See Nelson, 439 N.W.2d at 568-69.
60. Id. at 568.
61. Id at 569.
62. See id ("The ordinance in question here, . . . does allow an officer to differentiate
between conduct which is constitutionally protected from that which is not.").
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In her dissenting opinion, Justice Abrahamson expressed her dissat-
isfaction with the majority's willingness to find the language of the ordi-
nance adequate. Justice Abrahamson did not find an adequate standard
for what was to be deemed an "unusual place, time or manner for a law
abiding citizen to be out in public... ."' She pointed to the fact that no
clear standards were set forth to know "what circumstances warrant
alarm."' 4 Justice Abrahamson compared the ordinance to the statute in
Kolender v. Lawson," where the United States Supreme Court found
that because too much discretion rested in the hands of law enforce-
ment, the statute was unconstitutional. 6 In the instant case, Justice
Abrahamson believed that a police officer was not given adequate guid-
ance from the ordinance to determine what exactly "warrants alarm."6 7
Justice Abrahamson argued that "[t]he ordinance leaves all of the criti-
cal definitions up to the discretion of law enforcement and so, under
Kolender, it violates the federal Constitution."'
Additionally, although Justice Abrahamson agreed that it is ulti-
mately the judge who will decide if a suspect's explanation is satisfac-
tory, she points out that even though a defendant is entitled to a trial af-
ter an arrest, that does not "obviat[e] the constitutional requirement[s]
that laws include minimal guidelines ... .,69 Further, Justice Abraham-
son said that the loitering ordinance did not include any specific intent70
element unlike a loitering ordinance that was upheld in City of Milwau-
kee v. Wilson.1 In sum, Justice Abrahamson concluded that the lan-
guage in the ordinance was not sufficiently particular to fit the constitu-
tionally mandated scope, place, or purpose requirements and therefore
was simply too vague.7
63. City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 439 N.W.2d 562, 577 (Wis. 1989) (Abrahamson J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added).
64. Id
65. 461 U.S. 352.
66. See id at 361. The Kolender court found the statute to be "a virtually unrestrained
power to arrest and charge persons with a violation." Id at 360 (citation omitted).
67. 439 N.W.2d 562,577 ("Like the statute in Kolender, the Milwaukee ordinance leaves
the definition of this 'opportunity' entirely up to the individual judgment of the police officer
making the stop.").
68. Id (emphasis added).
69. Id
70. "This loitering ordinance, unlike the ordinance upheld in Milwaukee v. Wilson,....
does not require a specific intent to commit a crime." Id. at 577 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
For an explanation of "specific intent," see supra note 35.
71. See 439 N.W.2d at 577; Wilson, 291 N.W.2d 452, 457-58 (holding that a Milwaukee
ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad).
72. See Nelson, 439 N.W.2d at 575-78. (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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B. Eighth Amendment Challenges: Cruel & Unusual Punishment
The Supreme Court has addressed several cases in which it has had
to decide if the law punishes a person because of her "status" or because
of an act.' In 1962, the United States Supreme Court found a statute
unconstitutional in Robinson v. California'4 because it criminalized a
person exclusively because of his status.' The California statute made it
a crime for an individual to be "addicted to the use of narcotics."' The
trial judge instructed the jury that the [defendant] could be convicted if
the jury agreed that the defendant "use[d] a narcotic in Los Angeles
County, or that while in the City of Los Angeles he was addicted to the
use of narcotics." After an appeal to California's highest court and an
affirmation, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine whether there was a Fourteenth Amendment issue 8 The Court
73. Basic criminal law principles remind us that for a person to be found guilty of a
crime he or she must have committed a voluntary act-actus reus. See generally Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Pottinger v. Miami, 810
F. Supp. 1551 (1992). BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY defines actus reus as: "The guilty act. A
wrongful deed which renders the actor criminally liable if combined with mens rea; a guilty
mind. The actus reus is the physical aspect of the crime, whereas the mens rea (guilty mind)
involves the intent factor." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 36 (6th ed. 1990).
74. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
75. After the United States Supreme Court ruled on this case, numerous vagrancy laws
have been struck down. See, e.g., Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp 897 (Colo. 1969); Headley
v. Selkowitz, 171 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1965); Parker v. Mun. Judge, 427 P.2d 642 (Nev. 1967);
Hayes v. Mun. Court of Oklahoma City, 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
76. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660. Section 11721 of the California Health and Safety Code
read as follows:
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of nar-
cotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person licensed
by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden of the de-
fense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of violating
any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to
serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail. The
court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for a period not to ex-
ceed five years and shall in all cases in which probation is granted require as a condi-
tion thereof that such person be confined in the county jail for at least 90 days. In no
event does the court have the power to absolve a person who violates this section
from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.
Id. at 660-61 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721) (1957).
77. Id. at 663.
78. See id. at 664. The Supreme Court had to interpret the language of the statute in the
same manner that California's highest court did. See id. at 666. The Court therefore found
that the law did not proscribe any sort of act, but instead simply a condition. See it ("This
statute, therefore, is not one which punishes a person for the use of narcotics, for their pur-
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was troubled with the fact that an individual was punished not for the
use, possession, purchase or sale of narcotics, but instead for being an
addict-a status.79
It is highly unlikely that any State at this moment in history
would attempt to make it a criminal offense, for a person to be
mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.
A State might determine that the general health and welfare re-
quire that the victims of these and other human afflictions be
dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, con-
finement, or sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary
knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease
would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth AmendmentsY0
Six years later in Powell v. Texas," the Supreme Court examined a
law which made it a crime for a person to be in public while under the
influence of alcohol.'2 The appellant claimed that he suffered from
"chronic alcoholism" and that his "appearance in public" was not of his
"own volition."83  Further, the defendant argued that punishing him
would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the meaning set
forth in Robinson." The Court distinguished the instant situation from
the situation and holding in Robinson. The Court expressed the differ-
ence between a law which jails a person for suffering from a drug addic-
tion and a law which does not punish a person merely for drinking, but
for being in public while intoxicated." The Powell Court made a clear
distinction between attempting to punish a person because of a condi-
tion and punishing a person for wrongdoing. 6 The Court found the
chase, sale, or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their admini-
stration .... Rather, we deal with a statute that makes the 'status' of narcotic addiction a
criminal offense ... ").
79. See id. at 666.
80. Id.
81. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
82. The TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN. § 477 (West 1952) read as follows: "Whoever shall
get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house
except his own, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars."
83. 392 U.S. at 517.
84. See id at 532.
85. See id.
86. See id at 533. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, highlighted why the holding
in Robinson is not applicable here:
[Vol. 82:447
A CONSTITUTIONAL TRIUMPH FOR GANGS
status of being addicted to drugs is similar to that of being ill and there-
fore distinguished a law that punishes one for being addicted versus one
that punishes for voluntary acts like using, possessing, purchasing or
selling contraband. 7
Justice Black's concurring opinion grapples with the objection that
some individuals cannot control their drinkinges and therefore should
not be subject to such laws.89 Black suggests that criminal law benefits
punishing a person who have disregarded what laws proscribe without
considering whether his actions were "'compelled' by some elusive 'irre-
sponsible' aspect of his personality. ' ' Justice Black indicated that the
"punishment of such a defendant can clearly be justified in terms of de-
terrence, isolation, and treatment."'" In sum, Justice Black was satisfied
with the Court's limited application of Robinson and he believes that if
the Court were to expand its holding to allow people to claim that they
suffer from "'irresistible impulse' or "'compulsions' that are 'sympto-
matic' of a 'disease,"' then too many people would be deemed unpun-
ishable, claiming they suffer from some sort of abnormality. 2 Justice
Black concluded:
The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has committed
some act, had engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing,
or perhaps in historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus.
Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
87. See 392 U.S. at 532-33.
88. Evidence was offered at trial that alcoholism is a disease and therefore some alco-
holics should not be found criminally liable. See id. at 518-37.
89. See id at 540-45.
90. Id at 540.
91. Id at 540-41 ("I cannot think the States should be held constitutionally required to
make the inquiry as to what part of the defendant's personality is responsible for his actions
and to excuse anyone whose action was, in some complex, psychological sense, the result of a
'compulsion.'").
92. Id at 544-45. Justice Black concluded that
such a ruling would make it clear beyond any doubt that a narcotics addict could not
be punished for 'being' in possession of drugs or, for that matter, 'being' guilty of
using them. A wide variety of sex offenders would be immune from punishment if
they could show that their conduct was not voluntary but part of the pattern of a
disease.
Id. at 545.
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I would hold that Robinson v. California establishes a firm
and impenetrable barrier to the punishment of persons who,
whatever their bare desires and propensities, have committed no
proscribed wrongful act. But I would refuse to plunge from the
concrete and almost universally recognized premises of Robinson
into the murky problems raised by the insistence that chronic al-
coholics cannot be punished for public drunkenness, problems
that no person, whether layman or expert, can claim to under-
stand, and with consequences that no one can safely predict. 
3
The United States Supreme Court has clearly articulated what needs
to be included in an anti-loitering law for it not to interfere with the
public's fundamental rights. The Supreme Court's decisions should act
as blueprints for prudent legislators to draft laws so that they will not
later be struck down for being too vague, for being overly broad, or for
punishing a person for committing no wrongful act.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the appellate court's decision
in Youkhana and relied solidly upon precedent set forth by the United
States Supreme Court. It should not have come as a surprise that the
law was found unconstitutional, considering the similarities between the
ordinance enacted in Chicago and other similarly worded statutes that
have been found unconstitutional.
The City of Chicago argued that the ordinance specifically defined
what type of behavior would be found unlawful.94 Further, the city ar-
gued that the ordinance was a permissible restriction on fundamental
rights, that it did not create a status offense, and that it required law en-
forcement officials to establish probable cause before an arrest could be
made.95 In its decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that the or-
dinance was too vague.96 The court held that the gang loitering ordi-
nance was an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties-a violation of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.' Because the
court struck the ordinance down for being too vague, it refrained from
ruling on whether it created a status offense and whether it would per-
93. I& at 548.
94. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 59 (Il1. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct.
1510 (1998).
95. See id. at 59, 65.
96. See i. at 59.
97. See i.
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mit arrests without probable cause.9
The court first examined the ordinance to determine whether it vio-
lated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution.99 The court disagreed with the city's contention that the ordi-
nance was sufficiently clear so that "ordinary persons" could
comprehend what type of behavior was prohibited."® Further, the court
was troubled by the city's definition of the term "loiter. '" 101 Applying the
definition of the term loiter, as set forth by the city, the court concluded
that people with entirely innocent purposes may be found in violation of
the ordinance if it were not evident to a nearby police officer exactly
what the person's purpose was."" Additionally, the court pointed out
that the ordinance makes ordinary behavior criminal.103 Because there is
no additional conduct specified in the ordinance, in addition to loitering,
citizens have no idea how to act. The city asserted that the ordinance
only prohibits loitering with the accompaniment of a gang member."
However, the court interpreted the ordinance to allow police officers to
make an arrest when they have a "reasonable belief' that a person may
be a gang member. °' s The court held that the guidelines as to who is to
be classified as a gang member were ambiguous.1°6 The court reasoned
that not only was this additional element vague, but a "reasonable be-
lief' is not probable cause and that is not adequate to maintain a crimi-
nal conviction."
The city further contended that the ordinance gave people ample no-
tice because they could only be in violation if they failed to obey an offi-
cer's directive to move on."' The court analogized this to the ordinance
in Shuttlesworth where it was determined that too subjective a standard
98. See iL
99. The Fifth Amendment reads: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment
reads: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
100. Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 60-61.
101. See id. at 61.
102. See id. at 61 ("For example, a person waiting to hail a taxi, resting on a comer dur-
ing a jog, or stepping into a doorway to evade a rain shower has a perfectly legitimate purpose
in all these scenarios; however, that purpose will rarely be apparent to an observer.").
103. See id.
104. See id. at 62.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Id
108. See id.
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existed, and people would be allowed to "stand on a public sidewalk...
only at the whim of any police officer."' 9 The court opined that the lack
of any sort of direction for police officers leaves the door too wide open
for abuse and for arbitrary enforcement of the statute."0 Intentional
vagueness in the drafting of a statute works to give police officers the
ability to interpret the law as they see fit and often leads to it being en-
forced in a discriminatory manner."' Moreover, the court reasoned that
the City Council enacted the ordinance because of their belief that gang
members were an ominous threat and because of the city's incessant dif-
ficulty in arresting gang members for other crimes that they were sus-
pected of committing."
Lastly, the court determined that a restraint on a person's right to
associate with others and move around is a restriction on personal lib-
erty."' Although, the court recognized the fact that personal liberties
are not absolute, the court held that the Chicago ordinance unduly inter-
fered with personal liberties and therefore could not be upheld."' The
fact that a person is a member of a gang or associating with a member of
a gang is not enough to arrest the person. The ordinance authorized law
enforcement officials to arrest any gang member who may be walking
the street, regardless of whether he had committed a crime."' Because
gang members and anyone caught associating with them can be arrested
for doing nothing, the ordinance would punish people exclusively for
who they are.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court of Illinois came to the appropriate outcome in
Morales. There is an extensive history of loitering laws that have been
challenged to determine whether they are within the constitutional
realm. Society is unquestionably in need of more ways to fight crime
and curb gangs' abilities to escape being punished; however, enacting a
109. See id. (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90-92 (1965)).
110. Seeidat63-64.
111. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (citing Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940)). "Where lawmakers fail to provide minimal guidelines
to govern law enforcement, a criminal law, 'may permit a standardless sweep [that] allows
policeman, prosecutors and juries to pursue their personal predilections."' Morales, 687
N.E.2d at 63 (citation omitted).
112. See Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 64.
113. See id. at 65.
114. See id. ("Only government actions which intrude upon personal liberties arbitrarily
or in an utterly unreasonable manner violate the due process clause.").
115. See i.
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law that tramples upon the Constitution is not the way to accomplish
this goal. Criminal gang activity needs to be quelled, but people cannot
be arrested if they have not committed a crime. The problem with try-
ing to enact anti-gang loitering laws is that they are designed to put an
end to crime before it happens. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Ricks v. District of Columbia,'6 succinctly
summarized why these particular laws are composed in such an impre-
cise fashion. The court held that "[d]efiniteness is designedly avoided so
as to allow the net to be cast at large, to enable men to be caught who
are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution, although
not chargeable with any particular offense.""7
As established in Papachristou, the Supreme Court will not hesitate
to strike down a law that confers upon a police officer an indefinite
measure of power."1 Additionally, it is important to remember that due
process requires that everyone be aware of what the state forbids. 9 The
Chicago ordinance does not set forth a clear definition of loitering, nor
does it make clear to law enforcement personnel when an arrest should
be made. Further, an individual may not be aware that he is with a gang
member while standing on the street, yet still be found in violation of
the law. Regardless of how effective a tool this law may be for the Chi-
cago Police Department for arresting individuals who are evading the
law, the United States Supreme Court is presumably going to find it un-
constitutionally vague.
Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did not rule on whether the
Chicago ordinance interfered with protected freedoms, that challenge
will certainly be brought in front of the United States Supreme Court.
The First Amendment protects not only freedom of speech, but also the
right of association." Thus, legislation that impinges on these protected
freedoms is subject to overbreadth analysis. Simply loitering is not ille-
gal, so any type of limitation on loitering must include a restriction on
some other sort of conduct.12 ' Laws that criminalize loitering, in addi-
tion to some other activity, have prevailed. However, the problem that
arises if a comprehensive list of every type of prohibited conduct were to
116. 414 F.2d 1097, 1110 (1968) (holding that a vagrancy statute that leaves people un-
certain as to what type of conduct is prohibited is too vague and therefore unconstitutional).
117. Id at 1109.
118. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
119. For an explanation of due process, see Batey, supra note 2.
120. See State of Louisiana v. Muschkat, 706 So. 2d 429, 435 (1998) (quoting Coates v.
City of Jacksonville 405 U.S. 611 (1971)).
121. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164.
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accompany a law is that the law may fail for being too vague.'2 Fur-
thermore, commentators have suggested that because gangs are in-
volved in so many different kinds of crime, and a list would have to in-
dude an intent element for each crime, this notion may simply be
impractical."z The attempt by the Chicago City Council to add an addi-
tional component to the law is itself vague." Interpreting the statute as
the Supreme Court of Illinois did and relying on precedent from the
United States Supreme Court it is doubtful that this ordinance will sur-
vive an overbreadth challenge.
In Shuttlesworth v. City of Binningham," the city of Birmingham
enacted a statute similar to Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance
1 6
A literal reading of the statute resulted in a person only being allowed
to stand on a street or sidewalk with the blessing of a police officer.
Literally read, therefore, the second part of this ordinance says
that a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only
at the whim of any police officer of the city. The constitutional
vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration. It "does
not provide for government by clearly defined laws, but rather
for government by the moment-to-moment opinions of a police-
man on his beat."127
In Shuttlesworth, the Supreme Court was bound by the Alabama
Court of Appeal's earlier interpretation of the statute.1' The court of
122. See generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (holding the
ordinance prohibited so many types of behavior that it was vague).
123. See Berg, supra note 1, at 498.
124. See Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 62.
125. 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
126. The City of Birmingham's ordinance read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person or any number of persons to stand, loiter, or walk
upon any street or sidewalk in the city so as to obstruct free passage over, on or
along the street or sidewalk. It shall also be unlawful for any person to stand or loi-
ter upon any street or sidewalk of the city after having been requested by any police
officer to move on.
Ild. at 88 (quoting BIRMINGHAM, ALA. GEN. CITY CODE § 1142).
127. Id. at 90.
128. "The Alabama Court of Appeals has thus authoritatively ruled that §1142 applies
only when a person who stands, loiters, or walks on a street or sidewalk so as to obstruct free
passage refuses to obey a request by an officer to move on. It is our duty, of course, to accept
this state judicial construction of the ordinance." Id. at 91.
[Vol. 82:447
A CONSTITUTIONAL TRIUMPH FOR GANGS
appeals did not read the statute literally, but instead interpreted it in a
more narrow sense.29 The Alabama Court of Appeals read the ordi-
nance only to apply when a person "stands, loiters or walks on a street
or sidewalk... obstruct[ing] free passage [and] refuses to obey a request
by an officer to move on."''  It was this narrow rendering of the statute
that allowed it not to be deemed unconstitutional." The court of ap-
peals held that by including some sort of additional requirement in addi-
tion to loitering, the statute was constitutional; the ordinance prohibited
loitering that obstructs free passage and refusal to obey a police officer's
request to move on. Because the Alabama Court of Appeals inter-
preted the statute to clearly prohibit loitering, in addition to other con-
duct, the Supreme Court was bound to interpret it the same way and
therefore held that it was apparent what specific type of conduct was
prohibited.'n In the Court's holding it noted that even with this narrow
interpretation the opportunity remained for the ordinance to be applied
unconstitutionally.'33 However, because the Alabama Court of Appeals
interpreted the ordinance this way, the Supreme Court did the same,
and also found the ordinance to be constitutional.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan reiterated that had the
lower court given the statute a different interpretation the Court would
have reached a different outcome.' Justice Brennan asserted that "[i]t
is only this limiting construction which saves the statute from the consti-
tutional challenge that it is overly broad."'35
The Illinois courts did not give the Chicago ordinance a narrow ren-
dering like the Alabama Court of Appeals did in Shuttlesworth36 The
Illinois courts chose to pursue a different approach in determining the
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id. When the Supreme Court finds a law to be overly broad, it is simply saying
that the state's highest court has interpreted it as including too much. See Fallon, supra note
3, at 854-55. If a law is deemed to be overly broad, a narrow interpretation of it by a state
court will most likely permit the statute to be found constitutional. See id. "Accorded to the
states is the flexibility to develop state law through a legislative/judicial partnership, in which
the legislature can leave it the state courts to dot its i's, cross its t's, and excise its constitu-
tional excesses." Id. at 861.
133. See Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 91; see also City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 291 N.W.2d
452, 458 (Wis. 1980) ("[T]he fact that a law may be improperly applied or even abused does
not render it constitutionally invalid.").
134. 382 U.S. at 99 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
135. Id.
136. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 63-65 (Ill. 1997), cert granted, 118 S.
Ct. 1510 (1998).
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fate of the ordinance in Morales.3 7 The Supreme Court of Illinois per-
ceived the statute to have a "sweeping effect" and to be constitutionally
flawed.3 ' Consequently, the United States Supreme Court must defer to
the highest state court's interpretation of the statute as it did in Shut-
tlesworth.39 Because such an expansive interpretation has been attached
to the Chicago ordinance, the United States Supreme Court will be
compelled to read it in the same light and, accordingly, find it unconsti-
tutional.
The Supreme Court of Illinois did not consider whether the ordi-
nance created a status offense, but this too is presumably going to be ar-
gued to the Supreme Court. Commentators have discussed the reasons
for individual gang involvement and the motivations that cause indi-
viduals to join gangs. Some commentators are of the opinion that gangs
stem from the underclass and are the "consequence of restricted oppor-
tunities."' 4 This notion implies that social and economic obstacles are
the impetus of criminal gang activity and that gang members are not
presented with any options. However, an alternative proposition is that
gangs exist because of individuals' choices and because of "persisting in-
dividual cultural traits.'
141
Robinson and Powell illustrate the boundaries on what type of ac-
tivities can be made criminal. Whether being a "gang member" should
be considered a status so that the holding of Robinson would be appli-
cable is a separate query that has not yet been addressed by the Court.
In addressing this issue, a court would have to determine whether suf-
fering from a narcotic addiction and actively participating in a criminal
gang are equivalents. Alternatively, the Powell Court upheld a statute
that made it illegal for an intoxicated person to be out in public. One
may be able to analogize being a criminal gang member to the situation
in Powell. The Powell Court held that the defendant was punishable
because he partook in "public behavior which may create substantial
health and safety hazards, both for appellant and for members of the
general public, and which offends the moral and esthetic sensibilities of
a large segment of the community."''
As a society, we need to hold individuals responsible for their crimes
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 87.
140. See JOHN HAGEEDORN & PERRY MACON, PEOPLE AND FOLKS, GANGS, CRIME
AND THE UNDERCLASS IN A RUSTBELT CITY 112-13 (1988).
141. Id. at 113.
142. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,532 (1968).
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and not make justifications for them. Nevertheless, deciding whether
gang members are powerless to change their way of life, and therefore a
"status," is not the object of this Note; however, in light of past cases
that notion will certainly be made and ultimately have to be decided.
This is a very precarious area and the Court may simply choose to
overlook this area and base its holding on more familiar grounds.
The Supreme Court of Illinois acted judiciously when it did not con-
strue the text in the manner that the City Council had hoped it would.
The court would have committed an injustice had it been satisfied that a
second specific element was present. This ordinance is an obvious at-
tempt to give the police department a new weapon against gangs. As
promising as Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance may have been
as a crime prevention tool, it did not meet the standards set forth in Pa-
pachristou for it to pass constitutional scrutiny. Currently, Morales is an
affirmation of the guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme
Court. The future of Morales is uncertain, but if the Supreme Court
abides by stare decisis it will almost certainly affirm the decision of the
Supreme Court of Illinois. 43
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Illinois followed persuasive guidelines set
forth by the United State Supreme Court in deciding Morales. Al-
though the City of Chicago is trying to use proactive measures to assist
in its battle against gangs, this particular law dangerously encroaches
upon constitutionally protected rights. If this statute were to be upheld,
constitutional rights guaranteed to every citizen would be in jeopardy.
Although the City of Chicago is in need of a method to curtail its ex-
panding gang violence, it cannot be achieved by singling out so called
"undesirables"'" in society and taking away rights that are guaranteed to
them in the United States Constitution. Although criminal gang activity
is an epidemic that must be dealt with, it must be remembered that con-
stitutional rights are guaranteed to every U.S. citizen, regardless of
whom they decide to associate with.
Drafting an anti-loitering statute to satisfy all the concerns of the
143. As the Supreme Court has stated: "Stare decisis is the preferred course because it
promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judi-
cial process." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986)). But see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) ("[Tlhis Court
has never felt constrained to follow precedent.").
144. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,171 (1972).
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Chicago City Council is not impossible, but it certainly cannot be
achieved in such an indiscriminate way.145 The City of Chicago would
certainly benefit from having a statute that would prevent criminal gang
activity; however, legislators need to follow the framework set forth by
the United States Supreme Court, using caution not to craft a law that
infringes upon protected rights. The Morales court correctly summa-
rized: "[T]he city cannot empower the police to sweep undesirable per-
sons from the public streets through vague and arbitrary criminal ordi-
nances."'1' Morales demonstrates the consequences of drafting a law
without investigating what the judicial boundaries are. A preventative
law is conceivable if done in an appropriate way." The Chicago Legis-
lature has a justifiable concern in trying to rid the city of criminal gangs
and cities have a responsibility to keep their streets clear of crime.
Nonetheless, if this type of law were to be upheld a person could be ar-
rested not for what they have done, but simply for who they are.
THOMAS L. DOERR, JR.*
145. See Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 58.
146. Id. at 65.
147. The Court stated:
The city is free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks, obstructing traffic, lit-
tering streets, committing assaults, or engaging in countless other forms of antisocial
conduct. It can do so through the enactment and enforcement of ordinances di-
rected with reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited. It cannot
constitutionally do so through the enactment and enforcement of an ordinance
whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed.
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,614 (1971) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
* I would like to thank Assistant Visiting Professor Gregory J. O'Meara from Marquette
University Law School for his willingness to help me. Without his assistance, direction and
enthusiasm this Note would never have been completed.
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